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Geography and Democracy 
 
An Introduction 
 
 
Clive Barnett and Murray Low 
 
 
Where is Democracy?  
 
Amidst debates about globalization, neo-liberalism, and anti-capitalism, it is 
easy to forget that probably the most significant global trend of the last two 
decades has been the proliferation of political regimes that claim to be 
democracies. Democracy refers to the idea that political rule should, in some 
sense, be in the hands of ordinary people. It is also a set of processes and 
procedures for translating this idea into practices of institutionalized popular 
rule. In a remarkably short space of time, commitment to democracy has 
become universal. The universalization of democracy as an ideal, if not as a set 
of agreed-upon practices, is historically unprecedented: ‘Nothing else in the 
world which had, as far as we can tell, quite such local, casual, and concrete 
origins enjoys the same untrammeled authority for ordinary human beings 
today, and does so virtually across the globe’ (Dunn 1992, 239). This assertion 
pinpoints one key geographical dimension of the contemporary ascendancy of 
democratic norms. This is the problematic relationship between the particular 
historical-geography of democracy’s ‘origins’ on the one hand, and 
democracy’s more recent globalization on the other. However, it is striking how 
little impact processes of democratization, or democracy as a broader theme, 
have had on research agendas in human geography. While a great deal of 
critical analysis is implicitly motivated by democratic norms, there is relatively 
little empirical research or theoretical work that explicitly takes democracy to 
be central to the human geographic endeavour. This book aims to address this 
lacuna, by bringing together contributions from across the discipline of 
geography, addressing various research fields in which democracy is often a 
veiled backdrop, but not usually a topic of explicit reflection. We hope the book 
will thereby help to encourage the sort of detailed attention to issues of 
normative political theory that has recently been called for by others (Agnew 
2002, 164-178). 
The ghostly presence of democracy in geography can be illustrated with 
reference to a number of fields. First, debates on the geography of the state, 
starting in the 1970s with Marxist inspired work on the capitalist state, and 
developing in the 1980s and 1990s through an engagement with regulation 
theory, certainly took the concept of legitimacy and the representative 
dimensions of state institutions into account. However, detailed examination of 
routine democratic procedures of participation and representation have 
remained peripheral to the analyses developed in this area, which remain 
constrained by a conceptualization of political processes as derivative of more 
fundamental economic interests. More broadly, the neo-Gramscian state theory 
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most favoured in geography has remained largely untouched by the flowering in 
the last three decades of post-Enlightenment liberal political philosophy that has 
reinvigorated debates about democracy, citizenship, and power.   
The concern with social justice stands as a second example of the 
marginalisation of democracy as a theme in human geography. This might 
sound counter-intuitive, since the value of democracy as a form of rule is often 
linked to its role in securing social justice (Rawls 1971). Geographers have 
engaged in debates about social justice since the 1970s. But geographers’ 
interest in these questions has tended to focus on substantive distributive 
outcomes and spatial patterns, rather than on the issues of political process and 
procedure that would lead to democracy becoming a central topic for debate. 
Themes of geography and justice have been revitalized recently by the 
development of an explicit concern with moral and ethical issues (see Proctor 
and Smith 1999). Yet the focus of this ethical turn has been on moral rather than 
political theory, leading to a concentration on questions of individual 
responsibility detached from wider issues of institutional design and political 
processes. 
A third example of the displacement of democracy in geography is recent 
research on the geographies of citizenship. This work has concentrated on 
relationships between migration, citizenship and discourses of belonging and 
identity, and how these shape differential access to material and symbolic 
resources from states. Most discussions of these matters in geography have been 
conducted in light of the question of whether globalization complicates the 
spatial dimensions of membership and access to material resources of 
citizenship. The uneven development of rights of political citizenship, and the 
practices of mobilization and engagement these enable, has received relatively 
little direct treatment by comparison (Low 2000). Electoral geography is the 
area of human geography research that has consistently addressed the political 
and participatory dimensions of citizenship rights, and by extension the area 
that has been most consistently focused on core features of democratic politics. 
An interest in the dynamics of democratic process and procedure has been 
unavoidable in this work, as has a focus on questions about political 
representation. While there are many empirically detailed analyses of electoral 
‘bias’ in particular political systems, the broader normative issues raised by the 
subject matter of electoral geography have often remained unexplored. Only 
recently have geographers begun to explore the links between this 
predominantly quantitative-empirical field of research, and broader normative 
issues of political theory and democratic justice (Johnston 1999, Hannah 2001).  
Finally, one might expect that the proliferation of culturally inflected research 
in human geography would have been the occasion for a more systematic 
engagement with political theory. Power has certainly become ubiquitous 
reference points in the new cultural geography, and in work touched by the 
cultural turn more widely (Sharp et al 1999). However, on closer examination, 
this concept is a conceptual black box rarely opened up to detailed analysis (cf. 
Allen 2003). Too often, the recourse to the vocabulary of resistance and 
hegemony in cultural theory marks the point at which reflection on first 
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principles is displaced in favour of the imaginary alignment of the academic 
analyst with popular struggles (see Barnett 2004).  
Each of these examples point towards a recurrent preference in human 
geography for the urgent rhetoric of explanatory rigour, social change, or policy 
relevance, deferring protracted reflection on normative issues. As a 
consequence, geography’s treatment of politics is characterized by a 
combination of theoreticism and prescriptivism. By theoreticism, we mean a 
tendency to deduce political interests from deeper interests established outside 
of political processes, and into which the academic researcher has a certain 
privileged insight. By prescriptivism, we mean a preoccupation with 
establishing what should be done, and what things should be like. This 
preoccupation is often combined with voluntaristic injunctions to the 
community of researchers, governments, or social movements to work to bring 
these situations about. In short, the very terms in which geographers have 
engaged in discussion of politics, justice, citizens, elections, have nourished a 
persistent avoidance of reflection on the normative presuppositions of political 
institutions and on the basic criteria of political judgement underpinning 
democratic processes – criteria concerning what is right, what is just, what is 
good, and concerning how best to bring good, just, rightful outcomes about.  
As other commentators have argued (Sayer and Storper 1997, Corbridge 
1998), radical traditions of geographical research have persistently evaded 
normative political philosophy in favour of either the abstracted-individualism 
of ethical reflection or the certainties of radical political denunciation. It is in 
areas of the discipline often thought of as more ‘applied’ that one can find the 
most sustained reflection on the normative issues raised by democratization 
processes. This is the case, for example, in both urban planning and 
environmental policy studies, in which the meanings and practicalities of 
deliberative decision-making and participatory democracy have been 
extensively discussed (e.g. Burgess et al 1999, Hajer and Kesserlring 1999, 
Mason 2001, O’Neill 2001, Owens 2001). Likewise, it is amongst development 
geographers that one finds sustained critical discussions of the concepts of civil 
society and social capital, and of the meanings of participation, representation 
and empowerment, all issues with implications and currency far beyond the 
global South (e.g. Jeffrey 2000, McIlwaine 1998, Mercer 2002, Williams et al 
2003). Planning studies, environmental studies and development geography all 
connect up with broader interdisciplinary arenas where issues of democratic 
theory have been central in shaping research agendas in ways that is less true of 
the favoured interlocutors of ‘mainstream’ critical human geography.  
The disconnection of an increasingly theoretically confident tradition of 
critical human geography from the concerns of political philosophy and 
democratic theory requires some explanation. Is it because these other fields are 
not sophisticated enough in their treatment of space, spatiality, or scale to 
satisfy the agenda of critical human geography? As we will argue below, this 
explanation does not stand up to scrutiny. In order to explore the question 
further, we want to identify three points of potential overlap but actual 
separation between geographical research and democratic theory. Firstly, there 
is the problematic status of liberalism in human geography. We relate this issue 
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to geography’s treatment of the state. Secondly, there is the question of the 
degree to which the geographical imaginations of human geography and 
political theory diverge. Thirdly, there is the thorny problem of how to 
understand the value of universalism, a concept that is central to debates about 
democracy, but which geographers find hard to assimilate to their disciplinary 
matrix of ideas. In flagging these three themes, we want to contextualize the 
chapters in the book, by providing some sense of the most fruitful cross-
disciplinary engagements towards which they might lead.      
 
 
Rehabilitating Liberalism  
 
The templates for democratic institutions in the West, and indeed in most other 
contexts today, are usually referred to as being liberal in character. Alternative 
conceptions of democracy (including communitarian, deliberative, 
participatory, radical, and discursive approaches) all tend to define their own 
virtues by reference to the strengths and weaknesses of liberal theory and 
practice. However, liberalism is a rather broad label for a heterogeneous 
collection of ideas and practices. One tradition of liberalism, best exemplified 
by Hayek, explicitly seeks to restrict the scope of democratic decision-making 
in the name of the higher goods of personal liberty and free markets. One irony 
of the ubiquitous recourse to the vocabulary of ‘neo-liberalism’ in 
contemporary left-critical discourse is, however, the identification of liberalism 
tout court with this particular variety of conservative political thought. In this 
unlikely convergence, liberalism is reduced to a doctrine that counter-poses the 
state to the market.  
This mirroring of left and right readings of classical liberal doctrine erases the 
historical variety of liberalisms (Gaus 2003). The market liberalism exemplified 
by Hayek echoes a broader discourse of elitist disenchantment with mass 
democracy, which includes Weber, Pareto, Schmitt, Michels, and Schumpeter. 
What connects these thinkers is an intuition that the mass scale of modern 
polities, in both spatial and numerical terms, renders democracy implausible 
and hazardous. However, in contrast to this tradition, there is a diverse tradition 
of avowedly liberal thought that re-asserts the plausibility and value of 
extending democratic procedures across larger scales and into a wider range of 
activities. This tradition would include the work of Robert Dahl, John Dewey, 
Otto Kirchheimer, Carole Pateman, and John Rawls, as well as that of Noberto 
Bobbio, Jürgen Habermas, Hannah Pitkin, and Roberto Unger. This is a 
disparate group, but that is partly our point. It comprises a range of different 
projects that include a revivified Kantian republicanism, political liberalism, 
civic republicanism, and democratic liberalism. The key feature that these 
projects share is an effort to overcome ossified dualisms between equity and 
liberty, by finding practically informed ways of thinking through disputed 
conceptions of the right, the good, and justice. Taken together, these post-
Enlightenment liberalisms can be said to constitute a broad tradition of radical 
democracy, one that is characterized above all by a shared concern with 
defining democracy in relation to practices of citizen participation.  
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We think it important to reassert the significance of this tradition of self-
consciously egalitarian, democratic liberalism precisely because liberalism 
largely remains a denigrated tradition of thought in critical human geography. 
Radical human geography explicitly emerged by turning its back on liberal 
approaches in the 1970s. One consequence of this has already been noted. This 
is the persistent tendency to elevate explanatory accounts of socio-spatial 
process and substantive (outcome-oriented) accounts of justice over an 
engagement with the significance of procedural issues of participation, 
representation, and accountability (see Katznelson 1996). As a result, as 
Howells (1993, 305) has observed, while geographers have engaged with an 
ever widening range of theoretical ideas, the dimension of normative reflection 
on political principles contained in writers such as Habermas, Foucault, or 
Derrida is too often obscured ‘by the use to which they are put […] as part of a 
generic social theory to which we as geographers appeal almost exclusively for 
validation’. This predilection for social rather than political theory means that it 
is rare to find discussions of the geographical dimensions of inequality, or the 
spatialities of identity and difference, which are able to address fundamental 
questions concerning the significance of the values of equality, diversity, or 
difference that such analyses implicitly invoke.  
The suspicion of liberal traditions of political theory has had two further 
consequences for the ways in which geographers address themes of democracy. 
Firstly, liberalism as political theory is easily associated with the manifest flaws 
of ‘actually existing democracies’. It is certainly true that elements of liberal 
discourse (rights, freedom, liberty) can readily take on ideological value in 
defending undemocratic or illiberal practices. But this is hardly a unique feature 
of liberalism. In fact, this ideological potential seems a very good reason for 
critically reconfiguring key terms such as ‘rights’, or ‘liberty’ or 
‘representation’, rather than assuming that they cannot be divorced from 
compromised realities and that we must find less tainted images of authentic 
political action. 
This brings us to our second point, which is that ideal-typical liberal theories 
of democracy are persistently framed as the benchmark against which truly 
radical theories of democracy should be judged. As a result, the definition of 
radical politics is moved further and further away from the sites of mundane 
politics. Of course, one of the crucial insights provoked by a variety of new 
social movement mobilizations since the 1960s is the political stake involved in 
distinguishing what is politics from what is not. It is often argued that this 
requires that the meaning of ‘the political’ should be re-framed beyond 
narrowly defined understandings of government, constitutional rule, voting, or 
party support. One example is Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) conceptualization of 
radical democracy. This is perhaps the important example of political theory to 
attract sustained attention in human geography (see Brown 1997, Jones and 
Moss 1995, Robinson 1998). The characteristic Marxist response to their 
distinctive poststructuralist, post-Marxism has been to dismiss it as revised 
liberal pluralism. However, in their concern to de-stabilize standard conceptions 
of interests, the people, or representation (and to develop an alternative 
vocabulary of articulation and antagonism), it is clear that Laclau and Mouffe 
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are strongly committed to moving decisively beyond liberal formulations of 
democracy.  
Counter-posing mere ‘politics’, with all its disappointments and limitations, 
to the question of ‘the political’ is central to the poststructuralist project of 
radicalizing democracy. It is associated with the claim that grasping the essence 
of the political requires a form of analysis utterly different from liberal 
rationalism, which is supposedly unable to acknowledge irreducible conflict and 
antagonism. But this leads poststructuralist accounts of radical democracy into 
the rather thankless task of trying to redeem some democratic value from the 
resolutely anti-democratic political thought of writers such as Martin Heidegger 
or Carl Schmitt. With their analytics of forgetting and disclosure, neutralization 
and depolitization, these writers have become the unlikely foundation for new 
formulations of radical political action that apparently escape the 
inauthenticities of ordinary politics. In this strand of work, the ordinariness and 
banality of ordinary politics is transcended by the promise of a more heroic 
variety of political transformation rooted in an image of liberating a properly 
unconstrained creativity unjustly contained by the limits of state, capital, or 
bureaucracy. So it is that poststructuralist accounts of the political come to 
resemble a form of idealistic superliberalism (Benhabib 1992, 16). They claim 
to be more pluralistic, tolerant, and affirmative of difference than conventional 
liberalism, yet are unwilling to acknowledge the practical dependence of these 
values on the real achievements of liberal political cultures. This in turn 
explains the consistent difficulty that poststructuralist theories have in 
accounting for democracy as a specific sort of institutionalized politics (Dietz 
1998; see also Amin and Thrift 2003), beyond modeling political action on 
specific aesthetic practices such as performing or reading.  
The poststructuralist reconstruction of radical democracy therefore illustrates 
the paradox of the idea of cultural politics more generally. This idea carries a 
double resonance, broadening the range of activities understood to be in some 
sense political, but at the same time it carries the risk of jettisoning any concern 
for the realms in which politics most obviously still goes on. The danger lies is 
presuming that a whole set of traditional problems in democratic theory – the 
nature of representation, the meaning of legitimacy, and so on – can be easily 
resolved. With the near universalization of democracy in both theory and 
practice, the attention of critical analysis has shifted away from justifying 
democracy against other forms of political arrangement, towards finding 
fissures at the margins of actually existing regimes that promise better forms of 
democracy. As we suggest below, this dynamic of perfectibility might well be a 
distinctive feature of democracy as a regime of rule. But one unforeseen 
consequence of this democratically-oriented critique of actually existing 
democracy is a tendency to always assume that  ‘democratic discontent emerges 
from the institutions of representative democracy and can best be ameliorated 
by the wider democratization of social relations as they are reproduced in civil 
society’ (Squires 2002, 133). This stark opposition between representative 
forms of democratic politics, presumed to be the source of dissatisfaction, and 
idealized models of alternative politics, leads to an under-emphasis on the 
changing dynamics of formal political institutions of the state. This tendency is 
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exemplified by recurrent calls in political geography to transcend ‘state-centric’ 
views of politics (see Low 2003). Suspicion of the state as a central object of 
geographical concern is justified in terms of facing up to the historical and 
geographical specificity of state forms, and by calls for thinking about the 
possibilities of organizing politics differently (Agnew 1998, Taylor 1994).  
The suspicion in geography of state-centred understandings of politics is the 
main reason for the persistent non-engagement with liberal political theory. 
Liberalism is marked by a double recognition of the unavoidability of 
centralized decision-making and a resolute suspicion of its hazards. This 
implies that democracy needs to be understood in relational terms, as a means 
through which autonomous actors engage with, act for, influence, and remain 
accountable to other actors, a process carried on through institutional 
arrangements that embed particular norms of conduct. Two-dimensional 
political imaginations of resistance or hegemony are rather limited in their 
understanding of contemporary forms of protest, campaigning, and dissent, in 
so far as they tend to underplay the commitment to engaging with centralized 
forms of power, both public and private, that most often distinguishes 
contemporary social movements. Rather than resistance and hegemony, perhaps 
the better master-concept for understanding such politics is that classically 
liberal motif of opposition. Even the most radical forms of contemporary 
political action are animated by democratic demands (that decisions should be 
made out in the open and should be based on consent, and that institutions and 
organizations should be accountable), underwritten by democratic principles 
(above all, that the legitimacy of rule depends on authorization by ordinary 
people effected by the consequences of actions), and employ strategies that are 
the stock in trade of democratic social movement mobilization stretching back 
two hundred years (the theatrical mobilization of large numbers of supporters in 
public spaces). At the same time as appealing to the idea of democracy’s 
perfectibility, these mobilizations for greater democracy testify to the 
impossibility of any established set of democratic procedures ever completely 
embodying the preferences of all the governed in an unambiguously fair manner 
(Shapiro 1999, 31). If, then, democratic politics requires opportunities for 
inclusive participation and accountable representation, then the full value of 
these is only fully realized in the context of robust and varied practices of 
opposition  (ibid., 31-45, 235-8).  
In short, the heritage of classical liberalism is too important to be dismissed 
by those interested in progressive social change. It remains an essential 
reference point for connecting the actualities of political action to reflection on 
the principles and procedures that define democratic justice. It is this space that 
is closed down by market-based models of democratic choice, as well as by 
agonistic models of political action as contingent identifications expressed in 
insurgent acts of resistance. It is, moreover, important to redeem the term 
radical democracy from a narrow understanding of identity-politics. 
Rehabilitating the emphasis found in the use of this phrase by both Dewey and 
Habermas, radical democracy refers to an expansive sense of politics as 
involving participation in a range of formal and informal practices of 
identification and opinion-formation combined with a pragmatic orientation 
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towards getting things done. While keeping open questions about the status and 
scope of political action, it also suggests a less distanced engagement with what 
is ordinarily defined as ‘politics’ – with matters of policy, legislation, parties, 
lobbying, organizing – than is often countenanced in more rarefied accounts of 
radical counter-hegemonic politics.  
The key theme linking the alternative liberalism we sketched at the start of 
this section is a focus upon the ‘how’ of power. Rather than presuming that 
political judgement is reducible to a question of who holds power or of which 
forces are in political ascendancy, an emphasis on procedural forms of power 
focuses upon the difference that exercising power in relation to procedures of 
publicity, justification, and accountability makes to the substance and quality of 
outcomes (Habermas 1996). The emphasis of the broad tradition of 
participatory radical democracy upon the combination of citizen participation 
and decisive action opens up issues of political judgment to resolutely 
geographical forms of interpretation. This is not least the case in so far as the 
relationship between democratic participation and democratic decision turns on 
a paradox of scale – on the problem of how to institutionalize effective citizen 
participation in functionally complex, socially differentiated, and spatially and 
numerically extensive societies. Ideas of participatory radical democracy, 
understood as a distinctive variety of post-Enlightenment liberal political 
theory, therefore require a reconsideration of the distinctive imaginary 
geographies of modern democratic theory.   
 
 
Imaginary Geographies of Democratic Theory  
 
Democratic theory has a persistent problem with addressing the significance of 
its own implicit geographical assumptions. This is particularly the case with 
respect to the conceptualization of borders and boundaries (see Anderson 2002, 
Taylor 1994, 1995), a key issue in determining the identity and scope of 
democratic political rule. Very often, geographical assumptions of bounded 
territorial entities are not thematized in democratic theory, although there is also 
a stronger positive argument to the effect that democracy is not possible without 
sharp geographical boundaries between polities. While acknowledging the 
problematic elements of political-theoretical assumptions about the geography 
of democracy, we also want to suggest that the predominant geographical 
imagination shaping research agendas in human geography might lead to 
potential points of connection with democratic theory being by-passed. 
Geographers’ entry point into wider interdisciplinary debates has been their 
specialization on space, place, and scale as objects of analysis. However, this 
might also serve as a barrier to certain forms of interaction. There are three 
dimensions to this claim. Firstly, geographers’ conceptualizations of space, 
place and scale emphasize complexity and differentiation. Geographers’ spaces 
are uneven, relational, reticulated, blurry, stratified, striated, folded over, 
porous, and so on. Secondly, geographers’ strong emphasis upon the 
constructed, non-natural qualities of territorial entities has led to a wariness of 
focusing on national scales of political action. There is an in-built impetus to 
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de-centre and de-naturalize the national scale as the privileged focus of 
attention. This leads to a further displacement of much of the most routine and 
ordinary activity of everyday democratic politics already encouraged by 
poststructuralist understandings of radical democracy. Thirdly, and following 
from both of these previous points, the preferred scales of analysis for 
geographical research tend to be both above and below the nation-state, with the 
local, the urban, the regional, and the transnational. Even if territorial notions of 
multiple scales are rejected as an-overly formal and constrictive, then the effect 
is still to emphasize a further complication of flows, connections, networks and 
fluidities (Amin 2002). Combining these three observations, one might 
conjecture that a justified conceptual hollowing-out of the nation-state as the 
taken-for-granted scale of political analysis easily leads to an automatic 
presumption against national level forms of political practice. This supports an 
unexamined prejudice against some of the most mundane elements of liberal-
representative democracy, which are reduced to the benchmarks against which 
more radical understandings of democracy will be constructed.   
The tension between the conceptual emphasis upon re-imagining spatial 
complexity on the one hand, and the embedded geographies of democratic 
politics on the other, is not only a problem for geography. It generates recurrent 
problems for political theorists of democracy themselves. The disconnection 
between geography and political theory cannot simply be ascribed to the claim 
that democratic theory is inadequately sensitive to the spatialities of social 
processes. Modern political theory has, in fact, always been concerned with the 
difference that geography makes to the qualities of democratic rule. This is the 
case with theorists as diverse as Montesquieu, Rousseau, Madison, Burke, 
Paine, Tocqueville, Condorcet and Constant (Manin 1997), through to 
twentieth-century political science preoccupations with democracy and size (see 
Dahl and Tufte 1973, Dahl 1989). Furthermore, there has been a veritable 
‘geographical turn’ in recent political philosophy and international relations 
theory. This would include the deconstruction of the imaginary geographies of 
international relations theory (Connolly 1991, Walker 1993) that connect with 
geographers’ own critiques of the so-called ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994, Low 
1997). The supposedly taken-for-granted nature of boundaries and national 
level processes has clearly had its day in political theory (Shapiro and Hacker-
Cordon 1999). Geography has also ‘broken out’ in debates about the scope of 
political communities and political obligations sparked by ongoing 
confrontations of liberal and communitarian political imaginaries (see O’Neill 
2000). One central context for these debates is the process of trans-national 
migration, which has provided a real world reference point for questioning the 
taken-for-granted spatial assumptions grounding modern understandings of 
popular democratic legitimacy. The idea that citizens are obliged to respect the 
legitimacy of laws by virtue of having participated in making them has been 
questioned on the grounds that it unreasonably stakes political community upon 
shared cultural identities located within clearly delineated territories (Cole 
2000).  
These developments in turn inform discussions about the value of the national 
identity as the necessary pre-requisite of citizenship (see Benhabib 2002, Honig 
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2001), which develop the revival of interest in the Kantian thematics of 
cosmopolitanism and hospitality in the work of both Derrida (2001) and 
Habermas (1998). These debates have coincided with critical geographical work 
that more explicitly addresses the assumptions about geography, space, and 
place built into abstract formulas of cosmopolitan ethics and politics (Harvey 
2000, Entrikin 1999). Other areas in which the geographies of democratic 
theory have been conceptually twisted and stretched include consideration of 
the difference that geographical scale makes to the possibilities of instantiating 
democracy at the level of the European Union (Schmitter 1999), and in ongoing 
work on the role of social movements in historically consolidating national 
territorial democracies (Hanagan and Tilly 1999). In this latter area there is an 
explicit and critical reflection on the centrality of questions of space to the ways 
in which social movements are organized and develop (Sewell 2001), an 
interest that connects up with the growing interest in human geography in the 
spatialities and scales of social movement activism.  
This increasing focus amongst political theorists on issues of space, scale, 
borders, and boundaries suggests that there is considerable scope for a 
productive engagement with geography over issues of shared concern. But it 
also indicates that this engagement cannot plausibly take the form of 
geographers supposing that they have a monopoly on the most innovative ways 
of thinking about space, scale, territory and so on. Dialogue would be better 
facilitated by a shift in the balance and rationale of geographers’ arguments, 
with rather less focus on complicating understandings of space, and more on 
theorizing and investigating the reconfiguration of inherited geographies of 
democracy within a converging intellectual field where asserting that 
‘geography matters’ is no longer an issue.  
However, there might be a more fundamental tension at stake between the 
two disciplinary fields of human geography and political theory than their 
different conceptualizations of space and territory. Political theory’s traditional 
investment in taken-for-granted geographical dimensions of democratic 
political action, or its preoccupation with relatively simple concepts of scale and 
geographically contained polities, is not simply a conceptual blind-spot. It 
might stem from a fundamental investment in the value of universalism in 
defining the value of democracy. Squaring this commitment with the actualities 
of worldly difference tends to be achieved by holding fast to notions of bounded 
political entities within which universal rights and obligations are ideally 
secured. In the wake of theoretical and political criticisms that affirm difference 
and diversity over false universalism, this investment might be at odds with 
geography’s already deeply ingrained preference for the value of the particular 
and the specific.  
 
 
Spaces of Difference and Universalism  
 
We have argued that the conceptual and polemical trajectory of critical human 
geography has led to a search for politics away from the most obvious site of 
democratic contention (i.e. the state), and has favoured ways of understanding 
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political processes which reject the starting points of the tradition of thought in 
which the meanings of modern democracy have been most systematically 
subjected to normative-conceptual analysis (i.e. liberalism). In turn, we have 
suggested that geography’s disciplinary concern with the complexity of spatial 
and scalar relations sits uneasily with the characteristic ways in which space, 
scale, and territory have been conceptualized in democratic political theory, 
although there may be signs of a convergence of interest in this respect. It is the 
combination of these two emphases – the suspicion of state-centred, liberal 
political theories, and the attraction to ever more complex understandings of 
space and scale – that explains the strong affinity that geography has expressed 
with theoretical critiques of universalizing normative democratic theory made 
in the name of difference, diversity, and otherness. It is a commonplace to 
observe that liberal political theories have difficulty accommodating difference 
and pluralism at a theoretical level (see Phillips 1991, Mouffe 1998, Young 
1990). And it is a short step from this philosophical critique of concepts of 
identity and difference to the claim that liberalism fails to address geographical 
variations in socio-cultural and political arrangements. However, these two 
arguments – about worldly differences between peoples, places, and polities on 
the one hand, and about the conceptualization of difference as a philosophical, 
ethical, and political value on the other – might not be so easily, or wisely, 
aligned as is sometimes supposed.      
The fundamental question facing any critical analysis of democracy is 
whether or not the claims of universality built into democratic theory are 
nothing more than culturally specific norms. This is not simply a question of 
whether particular procedural models of democracy are appropriate as global 
norms. It is to do with more fundamental doubts over whether the models of 
universal interest and binding obligation that underwrite modern democratic 
theory might in fact operate to reproduce systematic, hierarchical exclusions 
and inequalities. A fundamental critical task is to unravel the logical and 
normative relations between the genesis and form of modern democracy. Does 
the historical geography of actually existing democracy mean that democracy, 
as a value, is inherently ‘Western’ in its essence? Some writers argue that the 
so-called ‘third wave of democratization’ in the last three decades is indeed the 
realization of a historical teleology towards liberal representative democracy 
(e.g. Fukyama 1993). In this sort of narrative, democracy is assumed to be a 
distinctive cultural formation with characteristics that are distinctively 
‘Western’ (e.g. Spinosa et al 1999). These sorts of assumptions are in turn 
countered by the charge that the universalism of liberal democracy is a false 
one, covering over particularistic exclusions (Parekh 1993), and in turn that the 
spread of democratic governance is as much a reflection of the post-Cold War 
geopolitics of donor funding, good governance, and brokered democratic 
transitions.  
Neither position is really adequate, since neither one addresses in detail the 
disjunctive relationship between what might be called democracy’s ‘context of 
discovery’ and its ‘contexts of justification’. Discussions of the meaning of 
democracy, whether by champions or critics, too often simply assume the 
identity of democracy as Western, and in turn conflate the significance of 
Spaces of Democracy 
 
12 
 
universalistic normative procedures with particular cultural norms of conduct 
and aspiration (cf. Sen 1999a). But democratization, both historically and in the 
present period, has had multiple trajectories. In this respect, Schaffer’s (1998) 
analysis of the practice of democracy in modern Senegal is notable for its 
recourse to the thematic of translation in understanding the cross-cultural 
variability of democratic norms. Schaffer underscores two points: firstly, that 
the meanings ascribed to democracy vary across cultures and contexts, but 
without losing their universal resonance; and secondly, democracy emerges as a 
modality of rule that emphasizes talking, agreeing, arguing, dissenting, getting 
things done, and holding to account. This analysis underscores the sense that 
democracy is the name for variable forms of rule that fold together diverse 
interests and plural identities in a pattern of decisive action in which the norm 
of ordinary people participating in the actions effecting them is accorded 
priority.  
The argument that democracy’s meaning is historically and geographically 
variable, without being wholly indeterminate, is the theme of David Slater’s 
(2002) recent critique of Eurocentric discourses of democratization. Slater is 
keenly aware of the unequal geopolitics of the diffusion of democracy, but is 
equally keen to stress that this does not de-legitimize democracy as a goal or 
form of politics. By excavating alternative, non-Western traditions of 
democratic theory and practice, this sort of self-consciously postcolonial 
critique of theories of democratization demonstrates that actual processes of 
political transition are likely to be the outcome of contingent combinations of 
‘top-down’ international pressures for good governance and ‘bottom-up’ 
pressures for social change and greater accountability.  
Following Slater, we want to suggest that any either/or choice regarding 
democracy needs to be resisted. Treating liberal democracy as either 
irredeemably parochial or as undifferentiated in its universal application is 
premised on an image of cultural space in terms of bounded containers, a spatial 
imagination from which the opposition between universalism and relativism is 
in large part derived (see Connolly 2000). As a way out of the oppositional 
polemics that surround discussions of democracy’s origins and application, we 
think it might be useful to think of the different trajectories of democratization 
in terms of family resemblances. This idea follows from the observation that 
democratization often involves a combination of distinctively local features, 
appropriations from elsewhere, and new inventions. For example, the 
emergence of modern democracy in the eighteenth-century depended on the 
appropriation of pre-democratic political mechanisms like representation 
(Manin 1997). In turn, twentieth-century anti-colonial movements borrowed 
and re-invented nationalist discourses, in the process establishing the value of 
national, sovereign independence as a basic element of modern understandings 
of democracy (Held 1997). And this hybridization of democracy is increasingly 
institutionalized through organizational networks of policy advocacy, social 
movement mobilisation, and human rights monitoring.  
These ideas – that democracy is a necessarily plural form, one that moves 
through processes of translation, and that different variants are related 
according to different degrees of family resemblance - allows us to specify the 
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geographical significance of thinking of democracy as an ‘essentially contested 
concept’ (Connolly 1993, 9-44). To describe democracy in these terms is not to 
merely suggest that people disagree about the meaning of the term. More 
fundamentally, it suggests that this disagreement is structured around recurrent 
contradictions between essential elements of the term – for example, between 
individual liberty and collective action, between majoritarian principles and 
minority rights, between participation and delegation.  Democracy is essentially 
contested because it is an inherently appraisive category – people are concerned 
with deciding the degree to which particular situations are more or less 
democratic. And crucially, democracy is also essentially contested because the 
positive appraisal of a context as democratic includes within it an allowance for 
changing circumstances and modifications (see Gallie 1956, 183-187). This 
means that the precise form of democratic rule cannot be established in 
advance, but is open to modification in light of new circumstances. Thinking of 
the universality of democracy in terms of family resemblance, hybrid 
appropriations, and inventive translations underscores the extent to which the 
problem of applying practices and norms developed in one context to new 
contexts is at the root of the critique of democracy’s presumptive universalism. 
And this implies that the conceptualization of democracy, and not just its 
empirical investigation, is an inherently geographical enterprise.  
Whatever their origins, discourses of democracy, citizenship, and human 
rights now form an almost ubiquitous formative-context for political action by 
states, corporations, popular movements, or individual citizens. This 
observation is not meant to endorse a complacent understanding of democracy 
as benignly capacious, but rather to emphasize the extent to which the 
normative horizon of the discourse of democracy shapes real world conflicts. 
This allows us to understand the positive attraction (as distinct simply from a 
negative critical force) of the difference-critique of universalism. This critique 
is most often articulated in a register that appeals, at least implicitly, to norms of 
universality and equity that it finds to be contravened in practice. The critique 
of democratic universalism made in the name of the cultural relativity of values 
re-inscribes rather than rejects universalism: ‘The meaning of the relative does 
not erase, but rather carries within it, a universal exigency’ (Lefort 2000, 144). 
Critiques of false universalism are made in the name of the equal recognition of 
identities, or of equal respect for competing notions of the good life. This 
observation does not negate the force of the critique, in the manner of a liar’s 
paradox. Rather, it suggests a different alignment of the universal and the 
relative, not as polar opposites, but as different registers of judgment.  
Our argument is, then, that the difference-critique of liberalism does not have 
direct political relevance as such, but rather functions as a supplementary 
critique that calls for certain principles and practices to be reconfigured in new 
ways. Chief amongst these is universalism, the value of which needs to be 
recast. There are two broad approaches to the post-Enlightenment revision of 
universalism in the wake of the difference-critique of liberalism. These two 
approaches – one of which involves a commitment to minimal universalism, the 
other a rethinking of universalism as an orientation towards openness to 
otherness – share in what Stephen White (2000) refers to as a commitment to 
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‘weak ontology’. That is, they are approaches that affirm certain fundamental 
values while at the same time acknowledging the contingency and contestability 
of those fundamentals.  
The first of these approaches to rethinking the value of universalism follows 
from the observed similarities in the meanings ascribed to democracy in 
variable historical, geographical, and cultural contexts. This is used as a basis 
for affirming a base level, minimal universalism in defining human needs, 
capabilities, and standards of justice (see Corbridge 1993, 1998). This is an 
argument most coherently developed in the work of Amartya Sen (1999b) and 
Martha Nussbaum (2000), both of who argue for a universalism of basic human 
capabilities. Their position gives considerable importance to the idea that a key 
human good is the practice of asking questions and offering justifications 
through which human needs are defined. Drawing on a similarly Kantian 
heritage, Onora O’Neill (2000) deduces a universalism premised on practical 
actions which are stretched out over space and time, and which implicitly assign 
competency, agency, and equal moral respect to others irrespective of their 
ascribed identities.  
The second approach to recasting universalism is distinct from the post-
foundational philosophical anthropologies implied by the adherence to a 
minimal universalism of reasonably defined needs. In this second approach, the 
critique of static, essentialist universalisms of justice, democracy, or rationality 
leads to a reinterpretation of universalism in terms of an orientation to openness 
to otherness. The deconstruction of exclusionary universalism leads to a 
redefinition of universality not as a singular, converged set of values (being-the-
same), but in terms of being-together (see Nancy 1991, 1999). From this 
perspective, the value of universalizing discourse lies less in its descriptive 
content than it does in the implied commitment to listen to and respond to 
claims for justice from others that is implied by invoking a universalist register. 
This argument is developed, for example, in Iris Young’s (1993) 
conceptualization of communicative democracy, in which democratic justice 
does not presume the transcendence of particularity in favour of a shared 
universal perspective. It depends instead on a shift from a self-centred 
understanding of needs to the recognition of other perspectives and a 
commitment to negotiation. ‘Appeals to justice and claims of injustice […] do 
not reflect an agreement [on universal principles]; they are rather the starting 
point of a certain kind of debate. To invoke the language of justice and injustice 
is to make a claim, a claim that we together have obligations of certain sorts to 
one another’ (Young 1998, 40). In this formula, universality is rethought not in 
terms of sameness, but in terms of openness. Openness is a value that 
presupposes plurality not sameness. This recasts rather than rejects the value of 
the universal, understood as an aspiration or impulse towards which claims for 
justice are oriented without presuming that this requires complete transcendence 
of partial positions  
This second approach to the universalism of democracy points towards the 
distinctive temporality that is characteristic of democratic rule. If democracy is 
understood to have has no essence (which is not the same as saying it is a purely 
empty category), this is because democratic rule is oriented to towards the 
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future. It is a form of rule that anticipates revision. In an abstract register, this is 
the sense of Derrida’s (1992) account of ‘democracy to come’, which turns 
upon two notions of the future: the future as programmed and planned; and 
radical openness of the future as the wholly unexpected, what cannot be 
anticipated. Derrida suggests that the promise of democracy inheres in the 
relationship between these two temporal registers: ‘For democracy remains to 
come; this is its essence in so far as it remains: not only will it remain 
indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but, belonging to 
the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its future times, to 
come: even where there is democracy, it never exists, it is never present, it 
remains the theme of a non-presentable concept’ (Derrida 1997, 306). This 
philosophical understanding of the temporality of democracy’s promise of 
perfectibility connects to a more pragmatic observation concerning the basic 
mechanisms of democratic modes of rule. Regular elections, rights to free 
assembly, and so on, all embody a commitment to deal with irreconcilable 
difference and unstable identifications in a peaceable fashion by temporizing 
conflicts. This depends upon on institutionalizing a distinctive temporal rhythm 
that combines open-ended deliberation, temporary identifications, the 
punctuality of decisive action, and retrospective accountability (Dunn 1999). 
Democracy, in short, is a political form that enables action that is characterized 
by being decisive without being certain, and is therefore open to contestation 
and revision. And this implies that it is important not to think of democracy in 
terms of identity, whether this refers to the presumption of deep cultural unity of 
a citizenry, to the idea that representatives and represented are bound together 
in a tight circle of delegation, or accordance with a single model of democratic 
rule. Rather, the value of democracy inheres in the quality of relations between 
different imperatives, interests, and identities – that is, it lies in the degree of 
openness to contestation of definitions of the proper balance between 
imperatives of collective action and individual freedom, between conflicting 
interests, and between multiple and fluid identities.        
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We have suggested that the universalization of democracy as a taken-for-
granted good does not imply that the meaning of democracy is cut and dried. 
Quite the contrary, it has coincided with a flowering of critical accounts of 
democratic theory and practice. If, at a minimum, this universalisation indicates 
that there is no alternative to the legitimization of rule by reference to the will 
of the people, then it also indicates the point at which the elusive qualities of 
‘the people’ become all the more evident (Offe 1996). The questions of just who 
should participate, how this participation is going to be arranged, and what 
scope of actions are to be subjected to democratic oversight, have become more 
problematic, not less, with the historical ‘triumph’ of democratic norms. It is 
these three dimensions – the who, how, and what of democracy – that the 
chapters in this book address. They all share a strong commitment that the 
geographies of democracy are deeply implicated in working out practical 
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solutions to these questions of democracy’s meaning. Each chapter sets out to 
connect the practicalities of democracy with questions of democratic theory, 
without idealizing democracy or collapsing normative reflection into a priori 
models of desirable end-states. Taken together, they underscore the need to 
explore democracy as a specific sort of politics that constantly invites the 
evaluation and appraisal of first principles.   
 
 
Summary of Chapters 
 
The opening chapter addresses the basic context for the whole collection, 
namely the geographies of democracy’s diffusion. John O’Loughlin provides a 
critical evaluation of the empirical and conceptual assumptions that inform the 
measurement and evaluation of democratization processes amongst academics, 
policy makers, think-tanks, and politicians. The next two chapters, by Ron 
Johnston and Charles Pattie on the uneasy relationship between electoral 
geography and political science, and by Richard Morrill on the politics of 
electoral re-districting in the United States, both develop critical insights into 
perhaps the basic mechanisms of modern democracy – elections. Taken 
together, these two chapters illustrate the complexity of representative and 
representational practices involved in the design, implementation, and 
interpretation of democratic electoral politics.  
The next three chapters each explore the implications for theories of 
democracy and citizenship of thinking seriously about the complex spatialities 
and the constructed scales of democratic polities. Sallie Marston and Katharyne 
Mitchell develop a critical account of the changing geographies of citizenship. 
They illustrate the variability of citizenship identities and practices in relation to 
scales of local state, domestic space, the nation, and increasingly, trans-national 
networks of migration. Their key contribution is the notion of citizenship-
formation, calling attention to the institutions, social relations, and embodied 
practices through which the meaning of citizenship is made-up and transformed 
in different contexts. David Smith addresses a fundamental tension within 
liberal theories of democratic legitimacy, namely whether there are any 
legitimate grounds to exclude outsiders from full citizenship status.  At stake in 
his discussion is the fundamental question of the scope of the basic unit of 
democratic theory itself, the political community. There has been a great deal of 
discussion recently over whether globalization spells the death-knell of national 
democracy, suggesting that democracy’s real level is lower-down, at the scale 
of the region, the locality, or the city. Murray Low explores the limitations of 
these arguments by examining the relationships of dependence and inter-
dependence between democracy at sub-national scales and national level 
decision-making.  
The following three chapters address another central conundrum of 
democratic theory, namely the identity and location of the collective subject of 
democratic politics, the public. Lynn Staeheli and Don Mitchell explore the 
changing meanings of the public/private distinction. They suggest that public 
action can take place in putatively private spaces, but also that what are 
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nominally public spaces are increasingly subjected to processes of exclusionary 
privatization. Gareth Jones develops similar themes, exploring the practices and 
performances through which new forms of public space have been developed 
and sustained in the context of democratization in Latin America. The strong 
emphasis of his analysis is upon public space as a realm of communication 
between different social subjects. This theme is further developed in Clive 
Barnett’s chapter. He argues against overly concrete conceptions of public 
space and overly substantive conceptions of the public, suggesting instead that 
stretched-out, mediated forms of communication be thought of as the space of 
democratic politics.  
These three chapters all touch on the cultural infrastructure that underpins 
democratic politics, and that sustains practices of tolerance, respect, and 
acknowledgement. This theme is further developed by Sophie Watson, who 
argues that Robert Putnam’s influential account of the relationship between 
social capital and the quality of democratic governance clings to a narrow 
understanding of the forms of cultural and social interaction that sustain a 
democratic ethos. She suggests that this approach, with its in-built tendency to 
see only decline in the trajectory of contemporary social trends, is looking in the 
wrong places for signs of vibrant democratic cultures, and in turn, looking at the 
wrong people – ignoring the emergent democratic subjectivities of organized 
women’s groups, youth cultures, and the elderly, amongst others. Finally, and 
developing the emphasis in previous chapters on the importance of citizen 
action and cultural practices in democratization processes, Byron Miller picks 
up one of the most pressing questions of contemporary democratic politics - the 
role and future of social movement mobilisation as a force for establishing, 
sustaining and deepening democracy. Miller’s discussion focuses in particular 
on the challenge of globalization for both the conceptualization and the practice 
of social movement mobilisation, and critically assesses the possibilities and 
limitations of emergent forms of trans-national movement mobilizations.      
In line with the preceding discussion in this Introduction, the combination of 
chapters in this book therefore aims to do two things. On the one hand, they 
address a broad range of arenas and actors through which the scope and 
meaning of democracy has been extended and deepened - including the media, 
social movements, community mobilisation, and patterns of associational 
culture. At the same time, they open up new questions about some well-
established fields of state-centred democratic politics, reconsidering the nature 
of elections and electoral systems, central-local state relations, and political 
membership. We hope that, in bringing leading-edge theorizations of space, 
place, and scale to bear on existing conceptualizations of democracy, the 
collection will put normative questions of democracy, justice, and legitimacy at 
the centre of critical geographic analysis of contemporary socio-economic 
transformations. 
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